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Abstract
We study social preferences in a three-person ultimatum game experiment with one
proposer and two responders. Any responder can unilaterally punish the proposer.
In three treatments, we vary the pecuniary consequences of rejection in such a way
that upon rejection of one responder the other responder is (i) affected negatively,
(ii) not affected, and (iii) positively affected. We collect complete strategies and
are able to classify (almost) all of them in intuitively plausible strategy types. Half
of the responders submitted strategies that are sensitive to the relative standing
with respect to the proposer and the other responder. The other half of responders
submitted strategies with an acceptance threshold concerning the own material
payoff, only. Moreover, we observe a treatment effect. A responder is more likely
to reject a proposal if this does not negatively affect his relative standing with
respect to the other responder. Recently developed models of social preferences
are not able to organize our data.
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1 Introduction
There is now a considerable amount of experimental evidence indicating that people not
only care about their own material well-being but also about the well-being of others.
In particular, in bargaining-like environments subjects exhibit behavior that seems to
be motivated by some kind of social preferences. In ultimatum games, for instance,
subjects acting in the role of the ‘responder’ show a strong tendency to reject small but
strictly positive offers and subjects being ‘proposers’ make rather generous offers.
Most of this evidence comes from two-person ultimatum game experiments with
one proposer and one responder. (The experimental research on ultimatum games
was initiated by Gu¨th, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982); for a recent overview
see Camerer, forthcoming). Extending such a bargaining situation to more than two
players raises several interesting issues about distributional concerns. For instance, in
contrast to two player games where the equal split is focal, norms of fairness may not be
that ‘obvious’ any more when three or more players are involved. Also, the willingness
to punish behavior perceived as unfair may be altered if other (possibly ‘innocent’
parties) are also affected by a punishment move. Connected to this the question arises
whether the position of the others relative to the position of oneself (e.g. responder-
proposer versus responder-responder) also influences a person’s readiness to punish
unfair behavior.
To study these questions experimentally we extent the standard ultimatum game
to a three-person game with one proposer and two responders. The proposer makes
a three-way proposal how to allocate a given pie between himself and the responders.
Each responder can either reject or accept the proposal. In the experiment we use the
so-called strategy method introduced by Selten (1967). The strategy method provides
more information about responder behavior, particularly for offers rarely observed in
‘behavioral’ experiments. We conduct three different treatments with varying payoff
consequences for the other responder in case of rejection. The consequences for a pro-
poser stay constant across the treatments. (The details of our experimental design
are described in Section 3.) With the help of this design our experiment delivers for
the first time rich information, namely complete strategies, about responder behav-
ior in three-person ultimatum games. Moreover, it allows us to investigate whether
responder-responder comparison plays an important role in ultimatum bargaining and
how different payoff relevant consequences of a rejection influence acceptance behavior.
In addition to that, we are also able to test the predictive performance of recently
developed models based on (outcome oriented) social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2000).1
Related studies
Only a few experimental studies exist that extent the ultimatum game to more than
two players. Gu¨th and van Damme (1998) conducted an ultimatum game experiment
involving three players: one proposer, one active responder, and one inactive dummy
1Our experiment is not especially designed to test these theories. We are more interested in gaining
a deeper insight in social comparison processes in general than in testing particular theories. For
experiments designed to test these theories see e.g. Kagel and Wolfe (1999), Bereby-Meyer and Niederle
(2001) and Engelmann and Strobel (2001).
1
player. The proposer had to make a three-way offer and the active responder could
accept or reject it. As treatment variable they changed the information of the responder
about the proposed allocation. The main result the authors obtain is that neither the
proposer nor the active responder seem to care about the well-being of the dummy. In
two similar experiments Kagel and Wolfe (1999) and Bereby-Meyer and Niederle (2001)
varied the consolidation prizes in case of rejection for the dummy player exogenously.
They find that, in particular, responders do not care about how much the inactive
player receives in case of rejection. This third-party neglect is also observed in a three-
person coalition formation ultimatum game experiment with two (potentially) active
responders conducted by Okada and Riedl (1999). They observe that proposers do
not hesitate to exclude a responder from bargaining when this seems to be in their
(material) self-interest. Nor does the not excluded responder punish the proposer for
excluding the other responder.2
Knez and Camerer (1995) present experimental evidence for ultimatum game ex-
periments with three players when all of them are active. In their experiment one
proposer played two ultimatum games with two different responders simultaneously. In
the control treatment the responders were not informed about the proposal in the par-
allel ultimatum game. In the experimental treatment this information was given and
responders could condition their acceptance thresholds on the offer made to the other
responder.3 In all treatments responders received commonly known strictly positive
(asymmetric) outside option payoffs. One of the main findings the authors report is
that about half of the subjects show some kind of between-responder social comparison.
In the experiment presented in this paper we also find support for the hypothesis
that social comparison between responders matters. However, our findings go consider-
ably beyond this observation. About half of the responders submit strategies that ‘care’
about the other responder. This ‘carrying’, however, is not uni-directional. Some of the
responders exhibit altruistic behavior towards the other responder by rejecting offers
that give too little to the other responder. Others, on the contrary, submit strategies
consistent with spite against the other responder by rejecting offers that give too much
to the other responder. The other half of responders submit strategies exhibiting an
acceptance threshold or aspiration level, which is independent of the offer to the other
responder. That is, they reject any offer that gives them less than a certain amount
of money. Furthermore, we observe that the rejection rates decrease significantly when
a rejection makes the other responder considerably better off. Hence, altruism to-
wards the other responder decreases with the worsening of the relative standing in case
of rejection. Besides these results we are also able to classify (almost) all submitted
strategies into ‘plausible’ strategy types and relate these types to the behavioral hy-
potheses derived from the above mentioned models of social preferences. Unfortunately,
it turns out that the predictive power of the models is low. The behavior of only one
responder is completely in line with one of the proposed models of inequality aversion.
2Two other ultimatum game experiments involving three players in a two-stage design were con-
ducted by Gu¨th, Huck and Ockenfels (1996) and Gu¨th and Huck (1997).
3As we did in our experiment, Knez and Camerer (1995) also used the strategy method. They were,
therefore, able to elicit acceptance thresholds for each possible offer to the other responder.
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The rest of the paper is is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the three-
person ultimatum game with the three different payoff treatments and also define plau-
sible strategy-types of responders. There we also formulate a number of behavioral
hypotheses, some of them being based on the above mentioned models of social pref-
erences. In Section 3 we describe the experimental design and in Section 4 our results
are presented. In Section 5 we summarize our findings and draw some conclusions.
2 Game and hypotheses
The implemented game is a three-person (simultaneous move) ultimatum game with
one proposer and two responders. The proposer proposes a split of a pie (money) be-
tween himself and the two responders. Both responders simultaneously decide whether
to accept or reject the proposal. If both responders accept all players’ earnings are
according to the proposal. If at least one responder rejects the proposer earns zero.
The earnings of the responders in case of any rejection depend on the treatment. We
implemented three different treatments.
• Treatment T1: Upon rejection of at least one responder all players earn zero.
• Treatment T2: A rejecting responder reduces only the proposer’s earning and her
own earning to zero. A non-rejecting responder always earns according to the
proposal.
• Treatment T3: A rejecting responder reduces the proposer’s earning to zero and
transfers the money proposed to her to the other responder. Hence, in case only
one responder rejects, the non-rejecting responder earns the amount proposed
to her plus the amount proposed to the other (rejecting) responder. If both
responders reject each earns what is offered to the other responder.
In all three treatments, both responders have a unilateral power to punish the proposer.
The pecuniary cost of punishment for the responders is also the same in all treatments.
The three treatments differ only in the earning consequence of rejection for the other
responder. She is either negatively affected by a rejection (treatment T1), or unaffected
(treatment T2), or positively affected (treatment T3).
In the experiment, the proposer makes a proposal X = (XP , Xi, Xj) such that
XP + Xi + Xj = K, with pie size K = 3000 points. XP , Xi, and Xj are the points
offered to the proposer, responder i, and responder j, respectively. For convenience,
we represent the strategy of a proposer in terms of shares of the pie: xk :=
Xk
K for
k ∈ {P, i, j} and xp + xi + xj = 1. We refer to the proposer’s offer as x = (xi, xj), the
shares offered to responders i and j. Table 1 shows the material shares for responder i
(the row player) for the simultaneous move decision of the two responders, for all three
treatments, given a proposal x.
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Table 1 – Material payoff matrix of responder i (row player)
T1 T2 T3
Accept Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject
Accept xi 0 xi xi xi xi + xj
Reject 0 0 0 0 0 xj
2.1 Responder behavior: strategy types and behavioral hypotheses
Before formulating the hypotheses concerning responder behavior we introduce some
plausible types of responder strategies. These strategy types are defined with the help
of the probability with which responder i will accept a proposal. This probability may
depend on the material share xi, proposed to him, as well as the material share xj ,
proposed to the other responder. In the following the probability with which responder
i will accept proposal x is denoted by qi(x). We define the following strategy types of
which a graphical representation is given in Figure 1:
A(a) Responder i follows an A(a)-type strategy with an effective aspiration level (ac-
ceptance threshold) a ≥ 0 if qi(x) = 1 for any x with xi ≥ a and qi(x) = 0,
otherwise. There are two important sub-categories of this type of strategy: A(+)
which denotes the strategy of a money-maximizing responder who accepts any
strictly positive offer, and A(0) which denotes the strategy according to which all
feasible splits of the pie are accepted.
RA Responder i follows anRA-type strategy with altruism towards the other responder
if for each xi there exists an xj such that if x = (xi, xj) is accepted (i.e. qi(x) = 1),
any x′ = (x′i, x′j with x′i ≥ x and x′j ≥ x is also accepted (i.e. qi(x′) = 1), and
rejected if x′i ≤ x and x′j ≤ x (i.e. qi(x′) = 0) with at least one inequality strict.
The responder’s minimal acceptable share is decreasing in the share offered to
the other responder. A special case of this strategy is obtained when it can be
characterized by two constants a and b in the following way: qi(x) = 1 whenever
x is such that xi ≥ a and xj ≥ b and qi(x) = 0, otherwise. The share a can be
interpreted as the responder’s aspiration level given the proposals that give at
least b to the other responder.
RS Responder i follows an RS-type strategy with spite against the other responder if
for each xi there exists an xj such that if x = (xi, xj) is accepted (i.e. qi(x) = 1),
any x′ = (x′i, x′j with x′i ≥ x and x′j ≤ x is also accepted (i.e. qi(x′) = 1), and
rejected if x′i ≤ x and x′j ≥ x (i.e. qi(x′) = 0) with at least one inequality strict.
The responder’s minimal acceptable share is increasing in the share offered to the
other responder.
W Responder i follows a W -type strategy if there is a xˆj such that for all x with
xj < xˆj responder i follows the RA-type strategy and for all x with xj > xˆj
responder i follows the RS-type strategy. This amounts to switching from ‘altru-
ism towards the other responder’ to ‘spite against the other responder’ when the
other responder starts to earn too much.
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V Responder i follows a V -type strategy if there is a xˆj such that for all x with xj < xˆj
responder i follows the RS-type strategy and for all x with xj > xˆj responder i
follows the RA-type strategy.
F Let O(E) be a neighborhood of the equal split (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3) with radius E. Responder i
follows a fair strategy F (E) if qi(x) = 1 for all x ∈ O(E) and qi(x) = 0, otherwise.
A responder i using such a strategy is willing to accept only proposals that give
nearly the same share to all three players.
In the graphical representation (see Figure 1) the strategy types are drawn from
the viewpoint of responder i. The strategies are presented in the space of the shares
xi and xj offered to responders i and j, respectively. The shares are increasing in the
direction of the arrows. Each point in the figure corresponds to a proposal that could
be chosen by the proposer. The grey areas depict the proposals that are rejected by
responder i using a strategy of the respective type.
We now formulate some behavioral hypotheses for the responders. Besides the stan-
dard money maximizing hypothesis they will be be based on various recently developed
alternative models of players’ motivation. In the following we assume that each respon-
der expects that the other responder accepts a given proposal x with some probability
pt(x) ∈ ]0, 1[. This is a subjective probability and t ∈ {T1, T2, T3} stands for the
three experimental treatments introduced earlier. It is quite natural to assume that
a participant in an experiment cannot be sure about the motivation and behavior of
the other participants. Hence, each responder in the experiment is inherently facing
some uncertainty about the actions of the other players. The subjective acceptance
probability lying strictly between 0 and 1 captures this fact. When formulating the
behavioral hypotheses we furthermore assume that pt(x) is constant in the proposal x
but may vary with the treatment t. When deriving the hypotheses we suppose that
a responder takes a best response, B(x, pt), to a proposal, x, given her belief, pt. In
the following we formulate the hypotheses by way of the dependence of the acceptance
probability of a proposal (xi, xj) on xi and xj . When this probability is independent
of xj then responder i uses an A-type strategy. If it is increasing (decreasing) in xj
then responder i uses a RA-type (RS-type) strategy. All formal derivations necessary
to formulate the following hypotheses are delegated to Appendix A.
Money maximization hypothesis. As a benchmark we present first the standard
prediction for a responder who is a selfish money-maximizer. In this case, the material
payoff shares for the row player (responder i) depicted in Table 1 represents also the
responder’s motivation matrices in the different treatments. The acceptance of any offer
with xi > 0 is the best response of a selfish money-maximizer in all three treatments.
Hypothesis MM Suppose responder i is purely motivated by his own material payoff.
Then i chooses strategy A(+) in all three treatments. That is, any proposal with
xi > 0 is accepted.
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(0,0) xj
 xi
(a) Strategy type A
(0,0) xj
 xi
(b) Strategy type RA
(0,0) xj
 xi
(c) Strategy type RS
(0,0) xj
 xi
(d) Strategy type W
(0,0) xj
 xi
(e) Strategy type V
(0,0) xj
 xi
(f) Strategy type F
Figure 1 – Strategy types in the three-person ultimatum game
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Table 2 – Aspiration level motivation matrix of responder i
T1 T2 T3
Accept Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject
Accept xi ui xi xi xi xi + xj
Reject ui ui ui ui ui xj
Aspiration level hypothesis. This hypothesis is based on a premise, formulated
by Ochs and Roth (1989), for two-person ultimatum games. Under this hypothesis
a responder bases his decision on a fixed material share she desires to receive. We
model the aspiration level as a strictly positive utility ui > 0 responder i foregoes
when accepting (earning) the offered material share. These considerations lead to the
motivation matrices depicted in Table 2. Based on them we can state:
Hypothesis AL Suppose responder i is motivated by an aspiration level ui. Then i
chooses an aspiration level type of strategy A(a) in all treatments. The effective
aspiration level a depends on the treatment. In T1 and T2 it is equal but in T3
it is lower. Hence, the (overall) acceptance rate of such a responder is the same
in T1 and T2 and higher in T3.
Table 3 – Bolton-Ockenfels inequality aversion motivation matrix of responder i
T1 T2 T3
Accept Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject
Accept ui(xi, xi) ui(0, 13 ) ui(xi, xi) ui(xi, 1) ui(xi, xi) ui(xi + xj , 1)
Reject ui(0, 13 ) ui(0,
1
3 ) ui(0, 0) ui(0,
1
3 ) ui(0, 0) ui(xj ,
xj
xi+xj
)
Inequality aversion hypothesis: the Bolton and Ockenfels model. Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) (henceforth BO) propose a behavioral model according to which in
an N -player game, player i’s utility function ui(pi) for a material payoff vector pi =
(pik)k=1,...,N has the form ui(pi) = ui(pii, φi(pii)) where φi(c, pii) = piic if c > 0 and
φi(c, pii) = 1N if c = 0. Here c =
∑N
i=1 pii is the total material payoff of all players,
and φi(c, pii) measures the relative share of player i in terms of the sum of the material
payoffs of all players. According to this model the distribution of the material payoffs
among the other players does not play a role. Only the relative share of the total
monetary payoffs earned by all players does. The model postulates that, other things
equal, the optimal payoff share is the equal share of the total material payoff. Responder
i’s motivation matrix with inequality aversion as in the BO model can be found in
Table 3. Based on it we can state:
Hypothesis BO. Suppose responder i is motivated by inequality aversion as in the
BO model. Then i chooses an aspiration level strategy type A(a) in T1 and T2,
and an RS-type strategy in T3.
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Table 4 – Fehr and Schmidt inequality aversion motivation matrix of responder i
Case xj ≥ xi > 0:
T1 T2 T3
Accept Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject
Accept L 0 L (1− βi)xi L (1− βi)(xj + xi)
Reject 0 0 −αi2 xj 0 −αi2 (xj + xi) xj − βi2 (2xj − xi)
where L = xi − αi2 (xp + xj − 2xi).
Case xi ≥ xj > 0:
T1 T2 T3
Accept Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject
Accept K 0 K (1− βi)xi K (1− βi)(xi + xj)
Reject 0 0 −αi2 xj 0 −αi2 (xi + xj) xj 2+αi−βi2 − xi αi2
where K = xi − αi2 (xp − xi)− βi2 (xi − xj)
Inequality aversion hypothesis: the Fehr and Schmidt model. Another model
of inequality aversion is proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) (henceforth, FS). Applied
to our three person ultimatum game their model implies for responder i a motivation
function of the following form:
ui(pii, pij , piP ) = pii − αi2 [max{pij − pii}, 0}+max{piP − pii, 0}]
−βi
2
[max{pii − pij}, 0}+max{pii − piP , 0}] ,
where pik (k = i, j, P ) is the material payoff player i receives at the current strategy. It
is assumed that the values of the inequality aversion parameters αi and βi satisfy the
conditions αi ∈ [0, 1[ and βi ∈ [0, αi]. Hence, according to the FS model players are
assumed to dislike advantageous inequality less than disadvantageous inequality.
In deriving the behavioral hypothesis based on the FS-model we have to distinguish
between two cases. The case where the proposal satisfies xj ≥ xi > 0 and where it
satisfies xi ≥ xj > 0 (with xp ≥ xi, xj assumed). In the first case the responder in
question (responder i) is offered less than the other responder and in the latter case it
is the other way round. Table 4 depicts the motivation matrices of a responder i who
is inequality averse as in the FS model.
With the help of these motivation matrices the following behavioral hypothesis can
be stated.
Hypothesis FS Suppose responder i is motivated by inequality aversion as in the
FS model and has a relatively low advantageous inequality aversion parameter
(βi < 23). Then i chooses in T1 a strategy that is in the class of RA-type strategies
(A-type strategy for x with xi < xj and a (pure) RA-type, otherwise). In T2 an
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Table 5 – Quasi maximin motivation matrix of responder i
T1 T2 T3
Accept Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject
Accept piAA 0 piAA xi(1− δγ) piAA (xi + xj)(1− γ)
+γ(1− δ)(xi + xj)
Reject 0 0 γ(1− δ)xj 0 γ(1− δ)xj xj(1− γ)
+γ(1− δ)(xi + xj)
where piAA = xi(1− γ(1− δ)) + γ(1− δ) if xi < xj ,
piAA = (1− γ)xi + γδxj + γ(1− δ) if xi > xj
RA-type strategy is chosen. In T3 such a responder chooses either an RA-type
strategy, or a union of an RA-type (if xi < xj) and an RS-type (if xi > xj).
Quasi-maximin hypothesis. Charness and Rabin (2000) propose a model of so-
called quasi-maximin preferences. In their model the player’s utility function is a
convex combination of the material payoff and a maximin payoff. The latter is a convex
combination of the material payoff of the ‘poorest’ player and the total material payoff
achieved.4 Applied to our three person ultimatum game the quasi-maximin motivation
function has the form:
ui(pii, pij , piP ) = γpii + (1− γ)(δmin{pii, pij , piP }+ (1− δ)(pii + pij + piP )),
where pik (k = i, j, P ) is the material payoff player k receives at the current strategy
and γ, δ ∈ ]0, 1[.
Assuming xP ≥ xi, xj , Table 5 depicts the motivation matrices of responder i
endowed with such quasi-maximin preferences. Based on these matrices the following
hypothesis can be derived.
Hypothesis QM Suppose responder i is motivated by the quasi-maximin criterion as
in the model of Charness and Rabin. Then i chooses A(+) in all three treatments
T1, T2 and T3.
Proposer-responder spite hypothesis. Table 6 depicts the motivation matrices
of a responder who is not only motivated by his own material payoff but also by spite
against the proposer and the other responder. The spite is related to the player positions
in the game and via that to the material payoffs the players receive. This leads to a
motivation function for responder i of the form ui(pii, pij , piP ) = pii − aipiP − bipij with
ai, bi ∈ [0, 1], where pik (k = i, j, P ) is the material payoff player k receives at the
current strategy.5 Again, based on these motivation matrices the following hypothesis
can be stated.
4The authors extend this distributional type of preference model to a model including intentions.
We do not deal with this model here because we do not measure beliefs.
5An axiomatic foundation of preferences that can be represented by this class of utility functions
can be found in Segal and Sobel (2001).
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Table 6 – Proposer-responder spite motivation matrix of responder i
T1 T2 T3
Accept Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject
Accept xi − aixP 0 xi − aixP xi xi − aixP xi + xj
−bixj −bixj −bixj
Reject 0 0 −bixj 0 −bi(xi + xj) xj − bixi
Hypothesis PRS Suppose responder i is motivated by spite against the proposer and
the other responder. Then i chooses in T1 an RA-type strategy, if spite against
the proposer is stronger than the spite against the other responder (ai > bi) and
an RS-type strategy, otherwise. In treatments T2 and T3 always an RA-type
strategy is chosen.
Table 7 – Strategy types predicted by behavioral hypotheses
Hypothesis T1 T2 T3
MM and QM A(+) A(+) A(+)
AL A(a) A(a) A(a)
BO A(a) A(a) RS
FS, xi < xj RA RA RA
FS, xi > xj RA RA RS
PRS, ai > bi RA RA RA
PRS, ai < bi RS RA RA
Table 7 summarizes the behavioral hypotheses derived in this section by identifying
the strategy types that are consistent with the motivation function underlying a par-
ticular hypothesis. According to the hypotheses MM and QM all proposals (giving a
strictly positive amount to responder i) will be accepted in all treatments (by responder
i). The hypotheses AL and BO both predict that a fixed aspiration level type strategy
is used in T1 and T2. For T3 hypothesis AL predicts an A-type strategy whereas BO
predicts an RS-type strategy. The inequality aversion model of FS makes qualitatively
different predictions for our game. It predicts an RA-type strategy in T1 and T2 but
for T3 a hybrid of an RA-type and an RS-type strategy (depending on whether xi < xj
or xi > xj holds) is predicted. Finally, a model introducing spite parameters assigned
to player positions, predicts an RS-type strategy in T1 and a RA-type strategy in T2
and T3 if the spite against the responder is smaller than the spite against the proposer
(i.e. ai < bi). If ai > bi then an RA-type strategy is predicted for all three treatments.
2.2 Proposer behavior
In each treatment of the three-person ultimatum game we study each responder has the
possibility to punish the proposer unilaterally. In analogy with the two-person ultima-
tum game the proposer’s expectation of rejection of too low offers may make him reluc-
tant to offer only small amounts. However, the treatments differ in the nonpecuniary
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costs of punishment the responders face. A proposer anticipating social preferences on
the responders’ side may therefore not only offer strictly positive amounts to the re-
sponders but may also alter the offers across treatments. We hypothesize therefore that
the proposers will give up considerable amounts and choose different proposals in T1,
T2 and T3. In T2 and T3 proposers may also try to exploit the rejection consequences
and make asymmetric offers.
3 Experimental design and procedures
We conducted two experimental sessions. Both sessions were run in October 1998
at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna. 34 undergraduate students of law,
economics, and business administration participated in the first session (henceforth, re-
ferred to as S1). These participants had previously experienced a three-person coalition
decision ultimatum game experiment. In the second session (henceforth, S2) also 34
subjects of the same study orientation participated. These subjects were experienced
in a computerized unstructured bargaining experiment.
Since we are particularly interested in the behavior of responders we applied the
strategy method introduced by Selten (1967). This method allows us to collect com-
plete strategies of all three players in each of the three treatments of our three-person
ultimatum game. In particular, it gives us the possibility to collect a sufficient number
of observations concerning acceptance and rejection behavior for proposals rarely made
in behavioral ultimatum game experiments.
After arriving in the reception room the participants were randomly assigned (by
drawing a card) one of the three letters A, B and C. One participant drew a card “ob-
server” and joined the experimenters to monitor them. All participants were informed
about this. We decided do use this procedure because during an experimental session
material was carried from one room to another and we wanted to avoid any doubts
that the decision sheets could be manipulated.
The participants were randomly matched in such a way that one individual with
letter A, one individual with letter B and one individual with letter C formed a group
to play the three-person ultimatum game. The letter A participants were assigned
the role of the proposer. The letter B and C participants were in the role of the two
responders. During the whole experimental session neither the roles nor the group com-
position changed. The proposers were seated in a different room than the responders.
Furthermore, the room for the responders was separated by a shield into two parts,
such that the groups B and C could not see each other. Any kind of communication
was prohibited.
An experimental session consisted of three “rounds”. In each round, each partici-
pant had to submit a strategy for the game played in that round. The proposers had to
choose a proposal from a menu of feasible proposals, and the responders indicated on a
decision sheet (see Figure 2) all proposals they wanted to accept. All feasible proposals
were stated in points. In each round the total number of points to be allocated was
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Decision sheet of person B - Round 1 Participant: ____
Offer to person C
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400
500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600
700 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 700
Offer 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800
to 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900
me 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100
1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200
1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300
1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400
Please, circle in the grey field all offers you accept.
Please notice that all offers that you will NOT CIRCLE are taken as REJECTED!
Figure 2 – Decision sheet of a responder
3000.6 In money terms this was worth approximately USD 20.− (100 points equaled
ATS 10.− ≈ 67 US cents).
Participants were informed that they will play three rounds but will learn the results
(i.e. decisions of other players and earnings) only after the end of the whole experiment.
In round 1, subjects received and read the instructions for the treatment T1. They also
had to answer some questions to demonstrate their understanding of the instructions.
The round was not started before all participants had answered the questions correctly.
Thereafter, each subject had to indicate his or her strategy. The proposers by circling
one of the feasible proposals and the responders by circling all proposals they want to
accept. Then the decisions sheets were collected and the next round was announced.
Rounds 2 and 3 were organized in exactly the same way. In round 2 subjects received
the instructions for T2 and in round 3 they received the instructions for T3.7 After the
third round an experimenter - monitored by the observer - evaluated the results of the
game in each round for every player. Subjects were then individually and anonymously
paid out.
In addition to the money they earned in two randomly selected rounds each partici-
pant also received ATS 70,− as show-up fee. The average earning inclusive the show-up
fee was ATS 220,− ≈ USD 15.−. Each session lasted approximately 90 minutes.
Note that the participants did not receive any information about the decisions of the
other players between rounds. In this way we approximated a true one-shot situation for
6There was a minor change in the decision sheets between sessions S1 and S2. The smallest unit
of divisibility was 50 points in S1 and 100 points in S2. The change was made to simplify the task of
filling the tables for the responders inexperienced in three-person ultimatum games.
7The complete set of instructions used in the experiment can be found in Appendix B.
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each treatment as close as possible. The subjects were also told that this experiment
is the last one they will participate in. In this way we avoided possible supergame
considerations across experiments.
4 Experimental results
In this section we present our observations concerning the submitted strategies of pro-
posers and responders. We shall first shortly report on the proposals made in the
different treatments and then switch to the more interesting and richer observations
concerning the strategies of responders. In particular, we shall show that almost all
submitted strategies fall into one of the categories (strategy-types) introduced in Sec-
tion 2. Based on these results we shall discuss how the actual behavior relates to the
behavioral hypotheses based on the different behavioral models also presented in Sec-
tion 2. In the following we shall make use of the pooled data set from both sessions S1
and S2.8
4.1 Proposer behavior
Table 8 depicts all proposals made in sessions S1 and S2. For convenience they are
sorted in descending order with respect to demands in treatment T1. On average,
proposers keep the same share of the pie (43 percent; 1300 out of 3000 points) in all
three treatments. Most often proposers keep exactly 1000 points, i.e. one third of the
pie. The number of equal distributions decreases slightly over treatments (11 in T1,
8 in T2, 7 in T3). However, according to the Page test for ordered alternatives there
is no difference in proposals between treatments (z = 0.754, N = 44).9 Furthermore,
nearly all proposals (91 percent; 60 out of 66) treat responders symmetrically. 4 out of
the 6 asymmetric proposals occur in treatment T3, with a maximal difference of 400
points between the responders. This leads us to the following
8One might argue that this is not without problems because the two sessions slightly differ in two
respects. Firstly, the subjects in S1 had some experience in a three-person ultimatum game whereas
those in S2 did not. Secondly, the responders’ decision sheet was ‘coarser’ in S2 than in S1 (In S1 the
feasible proposals increased in steps of 50 whereas in S2 they increased in steps of 100 points.). We
therefore investigated for both, proposers and responders, whether there are any differences between
sessions. For proposers the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the null hypothesis of identical
proposals in both sessions for all three treatments (The two-sided p-values are never smaller than 0.8.).
For responders we created an ‘individual aggregate’ acceptance rate by calculating for each responder
the percentage of accepted proposals out of all feasible proposals. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-U
test does not reject the hypothesis that these acceptance rates are the same in both sessions for each
treatment (two-sided p-values are always larger than 0.3). We also ran additional tests for the ‘semi-
aggregated’ acceptance rate at a given material payoff. That is, for each feasible share offered to the
responder in question we calculated the acceptance rate across the shares to the other responder. In
only three cases (at 800 points in T1 and T3 and 900 points in T2 and T3) we can reject the hypothesis
of no difference between the two sessions. In our view this is rather weak evidence for a session effect
and we therefore decided to use the pooled data in the empirical analysis. All empirical results we
present also hold when looking at the two sessions separately.
9As the number of observations is large enough, we use the large-sample approximation of test
statistics, see Siegel and Castellan (1988), p.185.
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Table 8 – Proposers’ decisions
Treatment T1 Treatment T2 Treatment T3
Proposer xp xi xj xp xi xj xp xi xj
S1 P3 3000 0 0 1400 800 800 1400 800 800
S1 P5 3000 0 0 3000 0 0 3000 0 0
S1 P9 1600 700 700 2000 500 500 1800 400 800
S2 P11 1500 800 700 1700 600 700 1800 600 600
S1 P8 1500 750 750 1700 650 650 1500 850 650
S1 P2 1200 900 900 1200 900 900 1200 900 900
S1 P6 1200 900 900 1200 900 900 1000 1050 950
S2 P5 1200 900 900 1200 900 900 1200 900 900
S2 P6 1200 900 900 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
S2 P10 1200 900 900 1200 900 900 1200 900 900
S1 P11 1100 950 950 1200 900 900 900 1050 1050
S1 P1 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
S1 P4 1000 1000 1000 1200 900 900 1100 950 950
S1 P7 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
S1 P10 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
S2 P1 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1200 900 900
S2 P2 1000 1000 1000 1200 900 900 1100 1000 900
S2 P3 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
S2 P4 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
S2 P7 1000 1000 1000 1400 800 800 1600 700 700
S2 P8 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
S2 P9 1000 1000 1000 1200 900 900 1400 800 800
Note: Sx Py stands for P roposer y in Session x.
Observation 1 . Proposer behavior
On average, proposers give up a considerable portion (57 percent) of the pie in all
treatments. In general, they treat the responders symmetrically. The modal offer is the
equal split of the pie among all three players. There is no significant difference across
treatments.
For T1 the observation of equal splits and symmetric treatment of responders is
in line with findings in other three-person ultimatum game experiments where both
responders have veto power (see Okada and Riedl (1999)). That there is basically no
difference between treatments seems a little bit surprising. We ask, therefore, whether
- from the viewpoint of a money maximizing proposer - the observed strategies are
also good strategies, on average. To answer this question we can use the observed
acceptance frequency of any feasible proposal (xi, xj) to calculate the proposer’s money
maximizing strategy. It turns out that the equal split maximizes the proposers expected
earnings in each treatment. Hence, the modal offer turns out to be a ‘good’ strategy
and proposer behavior is consistent with (risk neutral) money maximizing behavior, at
least on average.
4.2 Responder behavior
Figures 3(a)-(c) depict the average acceptance rates in treatments T1 to T3, respec-
tively. They nicely show that - for any given payoff to the other responder - acceptance
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Figure 3. Average acceptance rates
rates are increasing with the own payoff, in all three treatments. This behavioral pat-
tern is consistent with the findings in standard two-person ultimatum game experiments
where the acceptance rate is also increasing with the offer. However, our three-person
set-up offers more information. Holding constant the own payoff the acceptance rate
exhibit some kind of inverse V-shape supplemented with an increase in acceptances at
high payoffs for the other responder. Furthermore, the acceptance rate is maximal at
the symmetric proposal in all treatments. This pattern is most striking in treatment
T1 but to a lesser extent also present in the other two treatments. Hence, on average
responders seem to prefer symmetric offers in all treatments.
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Besides these patterns the figures also indicate some differences between treatments.
In particular, acceptance frequencies seem to be lower in T1 than in T2 and T3 (es-
pecially at relatively low offers to the other responder). That is, rejections seem to be
more likely if it does the rejecting responder not make worse off relative to the other
responder. To test the conjecture of different acceptance behavior in the three treat-
ments we calculated for each responder the ‘individual aggregate’ acceptance rate. This
rate is defined as the number of accepted proposals divided by the number of feasible
proposals. Table 9 depicts these acceptance rates (in descending order for T1) for all
44 responders in each treatment.
On average, the individual acceptance rates increase from 55 percent in T1 and T2
to 63 percent in T3. The Page test for ordered alternatives rejects the null hypothesis
of equal acceptance rates in the three treatments in favor of the alternative hypothesis
for increasing acceptance rates across the treatments (L = 463, z = −3.69, one-sided).
A pair-wise comparison of acceptance rates with the help of the Wilcoxon sign test
reveals a statistically significantly higher acceptance rate in T3 than in T2 (p = 0.03,
one-sided). Between T1 and T2 no significant difference can be detected (p = 0.16,
one-sided). We summarize these findings in the following observation.
Observation 2 . Acceptance rates
There is no difference in individual aggregate acceptance rates between treatments T1
and T2. However, a proposal is statistically significantly more likely accepted in treat-
ment T3 than in treatments T1 and T2.
The individual aggregate acceptance rate is a very rough measure of individual
acceptance behavior. To obtain a deeper understanding of responder behavior and to
relate it to the various behavioral hypotheses developed in Section 2 we investigate
individual responder behavior more profoundly now.
The submitted strategies by the responders reflect quite some heterogeneity and, at
the same time, exhibit lots of structure. This structure allows us to classify almost all
strategies into one of the strategy types introduced in the previous section. Table 10
shows this classification by responder and treatment and Table 11 summarizes this
information for each treatment. With the help of these tables we can state
Observation 3 . Heterogeneity and structure
In each treatment, around one half of the responders (22 out of 44, 25 out of 44, and
23 out of 44 in T1, T2, and T3, respectively) use an A−type strategy with an effective
aspiration level ranging from 0 to 1000 points. The remaining responders submit a
strategy that conditions acceptance on the distribution of payoffs among the other two
players. Among these responders, less than 10 percent use the egalitarian strategy type
F .
The observed heterogeneity among responders is perfectly in line with empirical
evidence from other experiments. The most prominent examples in this respect are the
different giving rates in dictator games and the differences in acceptance thresholds in
two-person ultimatum games (see e.g. Gu¨th and Huck, 1997). Besides the heterogeneity
the observed structure in the submitted strategies is striking. Only four of the 132
16
Table 9 – Responders’ acceptance rates (in percent)
Responder Treatment T1 Treatment T2 Treatment T3
S2 R4 100 100 100
S2 R13 100 93 100
S1 R14 91 82 100
S1 R18 91 91 99
S2 R8 91 91 92
S2 R15 91 91 91
S2 R16 91 91 91
S1 R9 82 91 72
S1 R15 82 82 91
S2 R3 82 82 82
S2 R18 82 82 84
S1 R22 80 81 80
S2 R17 77 72 72
S1 R13 72 82 82
S1 R5 67 62 71
S1 R1 65 52 32
S1 R17 63 63 55
S1 R20 59 59 70
S1 R11 58 57 75
S2 R7 56 28 100
S2 R20 53 63 59
S1 R3 52 59 72
S1 R12 52 91 54
S1 R4 50 60 44
S1 R16 45 45 53
S1 R19 45 36 36
S1 R21 45 82 99
S2 R10 45 28 63
S2 R12 45 45 45
S2 R9 43 43 43
S1 R2 41 59 72
S2 R6 40 14 37
S1 R7 38 38 91
S1 R8 36 54 45
S2 R22 36 45 32
S2 R21 35 28 28
S2 R1 28 30 38
S2 R11 28 28 28
S1 R10 26 11 7
S2 R14 13 17 14
S2 R5 11 43 52
S2 R19 7 15 15
S2 R2 6 9 9
S1 R6 4 9 56
Average 55 55 63
Note: Sx Ry stands for Responder y in Session x.
submitted strategies do not fall into one of the ‘intuitive’ strategy types presented in
the previous section.10
10In the experimental study closest to ours Knez and Camerer (1995) observe in another three-person
game strategies that can be categorized in a similar way. In their study out of 40 responders 19 submit
17
Table 10 – Submitted strategy types by responders
Responder Treatment T1 Treatment T2 Treatment T3
S2 8 A(+) A(+) A(+)
S2 15 A(+) A(+) A(+)
S2 16 A(+) A(+) A(+)
S1 18 A(+) A(+) A(+)∗
S2 13 A(+)∗ A(+) A(+)
S1 14 A(+) A(400) A(+)∗
S2 4 A(0) A(0) A(0)
S1 9 A(400) A(+) A(500)
S1 15 A(400) A(400) A(+)
S2 3 A(400) A(400) A(400)
S1 13 A(500) A(400) A(400)
S1 17 A(600) A(600) RS
S1 19 A(750) A(850) A(900)
S1 21 A(750) A(400) A(+)∗
S1 16 A(800) A(750) A(700)
S2 10 A(800) A(1000) A(600)
S2 12 A(800) A(800) A(800)
S1 8 A(850) A(700) A(800)
S2 11 A(1000) A(1000) A(1000)
S2 18 A(400) A(300) W
S2 22 A(900) A(800) RA
S2 1 A(1000) RA RS
S2 7 RA A(100) A(+)
S2 17 RA A(500) A(500)
S2 20 RA A(600) RS
S1 7 RA RA A(+)
S1 5 RA RA A(500)
S1 10 RA RA RA
S1 11 RA RA RA
S2 6 RA RS RA
S1 4 RA RS W
S1 1 RA W other
S1 12 RS A(+) A(700)
S1 22 RS RS RS
S2 9 RS RS RS
S2 21 RS RS RS
S1 3 RS RS V
S1 20 V V RS
S2 2 F F F
S2 14 F F F
S2 19 F F F
S1 6 F F W
S1 2 other W V
S2 5 other other RS
∗ Accepts all offers except (3000,0,0).
Given the clear structure in the submitted strategies there may be a good chance
that responder behavior may be explained by (or at least be consistent with) one or more
of the recently developed behavioral models. We can easily test this by confronting the
behavioral hypotheses derived from these models with the empirical evidence gathered.
an A-type strategy, 13 an RS-type strategy and 8 a RA-type strategy.
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Table 11 – Summary of strategy types by treatment
Strategy type Treatment T1 Treatment T2 Treatment T3
A(+) 7 8 11
A(a) 15 17 12
RA 10 5 4
RS 5 6 8
V 1 1 2
W 0 2 3
F 4 4 3
else 2 1 1
One of the advantages of our design is that the different models predict the use of
different strategy types in the different treatments.11 This makes it relatively easy to
test the predictive power of the behavioral models.
Table 12 summarizes the behavioral hypotheses and the number of subjects submit-
ting a strategy consistent with the hypothesis in question. Though we are able to relate
more than half of the responders (24 out of 44) to one of the behavioral hypotheses the
distributional models perform rather weak.
Observation 4 . Behavioral hypotheses based on distributional models
13.6 percent (6 out of 44) of the responders behave consistent with simple money maxi-
mization (MM- and QM-hypothesis), 11.4 percent (5 out of 44) behave consistent with a
simple model of spite (PRS-hypotheses), and 2.3 percent (1 out of 44) behave consistent
with the inequality aversion model of Bolton and Ockenfels (BO-hypothesis).
The huge majority of 72.7 percent of responder behavior cannot be explained by any of
the discussed behavioral models.
Table 12 – Behavioral hypotheses
Strategy type predicted in Responders consistent
Hypothesis T1,T2,T3 with hypothesis
MM and QM A(+), A(+), A(+) 6/44 13.6%
AL A(a), A(a), A(a) 12/44 27.3%
BO A(a), A(a), RS 1/44 2.3%
FS RA, RA, RA if (xi < xj) RA, RA, RS (xi > xj) 0/44 0.0%
PR with ai > bi RA, RA, RA 2/44 4.5%
PR with ai < bi RS, RA, RA 3/44 6.8%
egalitarian norm F, F, F 3/44 6.8%
other 20/44 45.5%
An non-negligible subset of 41 percent (18 out of 44) of responders uses a simple
aspiration level strategy type (A(a) or A(+)) in all three treatments. Applying the
Page test for ordered alternatives on this subset of 18 players reveals statistically sig-
nificantly (α = 0.05, one-sided) decreasing aspiration levels across treatments. Hence,
the acceptance rates significantly increase from T1 to T3 among the responders using
the simple aspiration level strategy.
11The only exception is that we cannot discriminate between hypotheses MM and QM. Under both
hypotheses all non-zero offers are accepted for sure.
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Observation 5 . Aspiration level strategies are prominent
Most frequently (41 percent) responders submitted in each treatment an A-type strategy,
A(a) or A(+). Furthermore, the aspiration levels decrease and consequently acceptance
rates increase from T1 to T3, on average.
Besides the prominence of the aspiration level strategies it is of interest that a non-
trivial fraction of 52 percent (those neither using an A- nor an F -type strategy in each
treatment) of participants use strategies sensitive to the distribution of payoffs among
all players. What about these 23 yet ‘unexplained’ responders? Do these responders
change their behavior according to some identifiable structure? Most of these respon-
ders use an RA- type strategy (8 responders) in treatment T1, an A-type strategy (7)
in treatment T2, and some other strategy in treatment T3. That is, we observe a
switch from the concern that the proposer shares a sufficiently high amount with both
responders, demonstrated by the use of RA-type strategies in treatment T1, towards
the concern for the responder’s own material payoff only, as demonstrated by the more
frequent use of A-type strategies in T2. We cannot detect a predominant strategy type
in T3. Interestingly, however, the use of strategies with an RS-type component (i.e.
the strategies RS, V, and W ) where for at least a subset of proposals the acceptance
rates are decreasing in the payoff of the other responder, increases from 8 in T1 to
14 in T3 whereas the use of an RA-type strategies decrease from 10 in T1 to 4 in T3
(see Table 11). A possible interpretation of this observation is that the change in the
consequences of a rejection moved the behavior from carrying altruistically about the
other responder towards more spite against the other responder.
5 Summary and conclusions
In this paper we investigate experimentally a three-person ultimatum game. Two
responders independently and simultaneously decide to accept or reject three-way pro-
posals in a menu of a number of feasible proposals. At the same time the proposer
chooses the actual proposal. Any responder can unilaterally reject a proposal, thereby
punishing the proposer by reducing his material payoff to zero. This punishment is
costly for the rejecting responder as well since she loses the share of the pie offered
to her. Our treatment variable is the consequence of a rejection for the other respon-
der. In treatment T1 the rejecting responder reduces the material payoff of the other
responder to zero as well. In treatment T2 the rejection by one responder leaves the
material payoff of the other responder unaffected. In treatment T3 the rejection by
a responder leaves the material payoff offered to the other responder unaffected and
in addition the material payoff offered to the rejecting responder is transferred to the
other responder.
We use the strategy method, which allows us to collect complete strategies of re-
sponders. That is, we receive information about the acceptance or rejection for each
feasible three-way proposal potentially made by the proposer under varying payoff con-
sequences for the responder. This provides us with the possibility to categorize the
decisions of responders in a set of intuitively plausible strategy types, which in turn
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delivers unique information about the distributional concerns of responders in the three-
person ultimatum game. With the help of the different treatments we are able to elicit
whether and how the material standing of a responder relative to the other responder
matters. Furthermore, we develop a couple of behavioral hypotheses (some of them
based on recently developed behavioral models of social preferences) and investigate
how well they can organize our data.
We observe quite some heterogeneity in the behavior of responders, which at the
same time also shows lots of structure. About half of the responders showed no concern
for the distribution of the material payoffs relative to the other responder. They sub-
mitted a strategy with a fixed acceptance threshold (aspiration level) in all treatments.
This aspiration level shows quite some variance across subjects and varies between 0
points (accept all feasible proposals) and 1000 points (accept only if at least one third
of the pie is offered). Only 14 percent of all responders submitted a strategy consistent
with selfish money maximizing behavior, i.e. a strategy indicating that all proposals
that give a strictly positive amount are accepted.
The other half of responders chose strategies that are sensitive to the absolute and
relative standing with respect to the proposer and the other responder. Many of these
strategies can be categorized either as exhibiting altruism towards the other responder
or as exhibiting spite against the other responder. In the first case responders reject
proposals that give the other responder too little, whereas in the second case they reject
proposals that give the other responder too much. Only a few strategies exhibit the
egalitarian norm of accepting only offers in a close neighborhood of the equal split.
Across treatments we observe two interesting patters. Firstly, the submitted strate-
gies become more spiteful when the payoff consequences of rejection change from in-
fluencing the other responder negatively (as in T1) to influencing she positively (as in
T3). Secondly, the individual aggregated acceptance rates significantly increase from
T1 and T2 to T3, on average. That is, the number of accepted feasible proposals is
significantly higher in the treatment where a rejection affects the other responder pos-
itively than in the treatments where the other responder is affected negatively or not
affected at all. Both observations indicate that a considerable subset of responders is
sensitive concerning their relative standing towards the other responder.
One might object that the second observation is due to a coordination problem faced
by the responders. Since, one rejecting responder is sufficient to induce punishment
of the proposer each responder might - because of the material cost of rejection -
prefer that the other responder to punishes the proposer. Therefore, in T2 and T3
both responders might choose to accept a proposal and try to free-ride on the other
responder’s rejection. We do not think that this explains our observation because then
we should observe an increase in acceptance rates from T1 to T2, what we don’t. We
prefer the following - admittedly also speculative - explanation based the endowment
effect.12 The responder - allocated hypothetically a particular share of the pie - has
the option to punish the proposer. In T3 this has - besides the material cost - also
the cost of giving up the ‘ownership’ of the share that could be allocated to her and
12See Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991) for a discussion of the endowment effect and Huck,
Kirchsteiger and O¨chssler (1997) for an indirectly evolutionary explanation.
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of transferring it to the other responder. This may - at least partly - explain why we
observe no difference in acceptance rates between T1 and T2 but observe increased
acceptance rates in T3.
Though our experiment was not explicitly designed to test the recently developed
behavioral models of social preferences of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ock-
enfels (2000), and Charness and Rabin (2000) we were able to formulate hypotheses
based on these models. Our general finding is that none of the models is able to or-
ganize the obtained data in a satisfying way. Only one subject submitted strategies
consistent with the models of inequality aversion. This observation of a rather weak
performance of the mentioned behavioral models is in line with findings of other stud-
ies explicitly designed to test these models (Kagel and Wolfe, 1999; Bereby-Meyer and
Niederle, 2001; Engelmann and Strobel, 2001). However, we do not conclude from this
that these models - which can organize quite some data obtained in other earlier ex-
periments - have to be considered as useless. Rather, we are convinced that the above
cited studies and our empirical results show that these models are not complete, yet.
Based on the results obtained in our experiment it seems to be necessary to develop
theoretical models that capture the heterogeneity of people, in particular, with respect
to their reference group and player position in a better way than the existing models
do.
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A Formal derivation of hypotheses
In the following we make use of the motivation matrices depicted in Tables 2 to 6 of the main
text.
A.1 Hypothesis AL
It is easily shown that accept ∈ BRi(x, pt) for t = T1, T2, T3 if condition (al1), (al2), (al3) is
satisfied, respectively. Where,
(al1) xi − ui > 0
(al2) xi − ui > 0
(al3) xi − pT3ui > 0.
Hence, a responder i with an acceptance threshold uses an aspiration level type strategy A(a) in
all treatments. The ‘effective’ aspiration level a is given by ui in T1 and T2, and pT3ui ∈ ]0, ui[
in T3.
A.2 Hypothesis BO
Bolton and Ockenfels postulate the following properties of the utility function ui(pi):
(A1): ui(pi) is increasing in material payoffs at a decreasing rate: ∂ui∂pii ≥ 0, ∂
2ui
∂pi2i
≤ 0;
(A2): keeping other things equal, the egalitarian distribution is preferred: ∂ui∂φi = 0 for φi =
1
|N |
for any fixed material payoff pii;
(A3): ui(pi) is strictly concave in φi : ∂
2ui
∂φ2i
< 0;
(A4): for a fixed pii, ui(pi) is increasing for φi < 1|N | , and decreasing otherwise.
Each player with this utility function can be characterized by two material payoff thresholds:
ri(c) and si(c).
The first threshold ri(c) is defined by ri(c) ≡ argmaxφi ui(cφi, φi) for c > 0. It is the division of
the pie chosen by a dictator i in the dictator game, capturing the trade-off between monetary
payoff and relative payoff with respect to the average payoff in the group. The second threshold
si(c) is defined by ui(csi(c), si(c)) = ui(0, 1|N | ). It is the rejection threshold in an ultimatum
game that requires the acceptance of all responders so that the proposal is implemented, and
otherwise all players earn a material payoff of zero. The assumptions (A1) to (A4) guarantee
the existence of a unique ri(c) ∈ [ 1|N | , 1], and a unique si(c) ∈ ]0, 1|N | ] .
We normalize the utility of the worst outcome by ui(0, 0) = 0. In the three person ultimatum
game, it holds that accept ∈ BRi(x, pt) for treatment t = T1, T2, T3 if condition (bo1), (bo2),
(bo3) is satisfied, respectively. Where,
(bo1) ui(xi, xi)− ui(0, 13 ) > 0
(bo2) pT2(ui(xi, xi) + ui(0, 13 )− u1(xi, 1)) > ui(0, 13 )− u1(xi, 1)
(bo3) pT3(ui(xi, xi) + ui(xj ,
xj
xi+xj
)− ui(xi + xj , 1)) > ui(xj , xjxi+xj )− ui(xi + xj , 1)
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For T1, observe that by (A1)−(A4), there is an si ∈ [0, 13 ] satisfying ui(0, 13 ) = ui(si, si). By the
monotonicity assumption (A1), responder i rejects in treatment T1 any proposal with xi < si.
Moreover, if i accepts some proposal x then i accepts any proposal x′ such that x′i = xi, because
the function ui is independent of xj and xP . Hence, the Bolton and Ockenfels model predicts
in T1 an aspiration level type strategy with an aspiration level si.
For T2, define M(xi) = ui(0, 13 )−ui(xi, 1). Observe that M(xi) is decreasing in xi because
the function ui is increasing in xi for a fixed φi. Condition (bo2) can be written as pT2ui(xi, xi)−
(1 − pT2)M(xi) > 0. The left hand side is increasing in xi for xi < 13 , and independent of xj .
Hence, i’s best response in T2 is an aspiration level type strategy.
For T3, define R(xi, xj) = ui(xj ,
xj
xi+xj
)− ui(xi + xj , 1). Condition (bo3) can be written as
pT3ui(xi, xi)−(1−p)R(xi, xj) > 0. For a fixed xi, R(xi, xj) is increasing in xj . To see this, note
that ∂R∂xj = ui1(xj ,
xj
xi+xj
)− ui1(xi + xj , 1) + ui2(xi + xj , 1) xi(xi+xj)2 > 0. 13 ui1 is decreasing in
its first component by (A1). Hence, if (xi, xj) is accepted, then also (xi, x′j) such that x′j < xj
is accepted. Hence, i’s best response in T3 is a RS-type strategy.
A.3 Hypothesis FS
In deriving the behavioral hypothesis based on the FS-model we have to distinguish the two
cases xP ≥ xj ≥ xi > 0 and xP ≥ xi ≥ xj > 0.
Case: xP ≥ xj > xi
It holds that accept ∈ BRi(x, pt) for treatment t = T1, T2, T3 if condition (fs1), (fs2), (fs3) is
satisfied, respectively. Where
(fs1) xi > αi2+3αi
(fs2) xi > p
T2αi
3pαi+2pT2βi+2(1−βi) (1− xj)
(fs3) xi > p
T3αi
2−3βi+pT3(4αi+3βi) (1− xj)
In T1, i’s best response is an aspiration level strategy type with the effective aspiration level
αi
2+3αi
∈ [0, 15 ].
In T2, the expression 3pαi+2pT2βi+2(1−βi) is strictly positive for βi ∈ [0, 1[. Therefore,
i’s best response is an RA-type strategy. Moreover, if x is accepted in T1 then it also accepted
in T2, because the inequality αi2+3αi >
pT2αi
3pαi+2pT2βi+2(1−βi) is always satisfied for our parameters.
Suppose that βi < 23 , then - in T3 - the denominator in (fs3) is strictly positive for any
pT3 ∈ ]0, 1[, so that i’s best response is an RA− type strategy.14
Case: xP ≥ xi > xj
It holds that accept ∈ BRi(x, pt) for treatment t = T1, T2, T3 if condition (fs1’), (fs2’), (fs3’)
is satisfied, respectively. Where
(fs1’) xi >
αi−(αi+βi)xj
2αi+2−βi
13ui1(.) is the partial derivative of the utility function ui with respect to its first argument, and ui2(.)
is the partial derivative of the utility function ui with respect to the its second argument.
14A high advantageous inequality aversion parameter (e.g. β > 23 ) represents the unlikely case of
altruistic preferences. There is no strong experimental support for the existence of such preferences,
at least in three-person ultimatum games (see, Gu¨th and van Damme, 1998; Okada and Riedl, 1999).
For the sale of completeness we note here that if βi > 23 , then (fs3) is always satisfied because the
right-hand side is strictly negative, so that i’s best response is an A(+)-type strategy.
26
(fs2’) xi > pT2
αi−(2αi+βi)xj
pT2(2αi+βi)+2(1−βi)
(fs3’) xi >
pT3αi+(αi+βi−p(3αi+2βi))xj
2pT3αi+αi+pT3βi+2(1−βi)
The denominator in the conditions (fs1’), (fs2’) and (fs3’) is strictly positive for βi ∈ [0, 1[.
Hence, in T1 and T2, i’s best response is an RA-type strategy. In T3, i’s best response is
either an RS-type or an RA-type strategy, depending on αi, βi, pT3. If pT3 > αi+βi3αi+2βi then an
RA−type strategy is optimal, else an RS−type strategy.
A.4 Hypothesis QM
In deriving the behavioral hypothesis based on the quasi maximin model we have to distinguish
the two cases xP ≥ xj ≥ xi > 0 and xP ≥ xi ≥ xj > 0.
Case: xP ≥ xj > xi
It holds that accept ∈ BRi(x, pt) for treatment t = T1, T2, T3 if condition (qm1), (qm2), (qm3)
is satisfied, respectively. Where,
(qm1) pT1 (xi(1− γ(1− δ)) + γ(1− δ)) > 0
(qm2) xi (1 + γ(δ(2p− 1)− pT2)) > pT2γ(1− δ)(xj − 1)
(qm3) xi(γδpT3 + 1− γ) > pT3(1− δ)γ (xj − 1) .
In all treatments A(+) is predicted. To see this note that the right hand side of the condi-
tions (qm1), (qm2) and (qm3) is non-positive in all cases because xj ∈ [0, 1[ and δ ∈ ]0, 1[.
Furthermore, the left hand side of the conditions is positive for γ, δ ∈ ]0, 1[. In particular, in
T2 this is the case if 1 + γ(δ(2pT2 − 1) − pT2) > 0. Consider now first the case where δ > 12 .
Then, γ(δ(2pT2 − 1) − pT2) is increasing in pT2 and attains its minimum at pT2 = 0, where
1+γ(δ(2pT2−1)−p) = 1−γδ > 0. Consider now the case δ < 12 . Then, γ(δ(2pT2−1)−p) is de-
creasing in pT2, and attains minimum at pT2 = 1 where 1+γ(δ(2pT2−1)−pT2) = 1−γ(1−δ) > 0.
Case: xP ≥ xi > xj
It holds that accept ∈ BRi(x, pt) for treatment t = T1, T2, T3 if condition (qm1’), (qm2’),
(qm3’) is satisfied, respectively. Where,
(qm1’) pT1 ((1− γ)xi + γδxj + γ(1− δ)) > 0
(qm2’) xi(1− pT2γ − δγ + pT2δγ) > pT2γ(xj(1− 2δ)− 1)
(qm3’) xi(1− γ) > pT3γ(xj(1− 2δ)− 1)
In all three treatments A(+) is predicted. To see this note that the right hand side of the
conditions (qm1’), (qm2’) and (qm3’) is non-positive in all cases. In particular, in T2 and T3
this is the case because xj ∈ [0, 1[ and δ ∈ ]0, 1[, therefore xj(1− 2δ) < 1 holds. The left hand
side of the conditions is positive. In particular, in T2 this is the case if 1−pT2γ−δγ+pT2δγ > 0.
This expression is decreasing in pT2, attaining its minimum at pT2 = 1, where 1 − δγ > 0 for
γ, δ ∈ ]0, 1[.
A.5 Hypothesis PRS
It easily shown that accept ∈ BRi(x, pt) for treatment t = T1, T2, T3 if condition (pr1), (pr2),
(pr3) is satisfied, respectively. Where,
(pr1) xi > ai1+ai − xj ai−bi1+ai
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(pr2) xi > p
T2ai
pT2ai+1
(1− xj)
(pr3) xi > p
T3ai
1+pT3ai+bi
(1− xj)
If ai > bi, i’s best response in all treatments is an RA-type strategy if ai > bi. If ai < bi,
i’s best response in T1 is an RS-type startegy, and in T2 and T3 an RA-type strategy.
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B Instructions for the experiment
These are the instructions for subjects who had drawn the letter A {B (C)}, respectively. The
instructions are translated from German.
Instructions You will now participate in an experiment on economic decision making that is
used to study human behavior in bargaining situations. This experiment is financed by several
scientific institutions. If you read the following explanations carefully, you can (besides a fixed
amount of 70 Schilling) earn money with the decisions you will make in the experiment. There-
fore, it is very important that you read the instructions carefully.
The experiment consists of three rounds. After the third round, the experiment is over. You
will then be paid out the amount you earn in two out of the three rounds. The two rounds
determining your earning will be chosen at random after the third round.
During the experiment we speak of points instead of Schillings. Your total earnings will there-
fore be calculated in points. Your earnings in Schillings will be calculated with the exchange
rate 10 points = 1 Schilling.
The instructions handed out to you are for your private information only. It is prohibited to
talk during the experiment. If you have questions, please raise your hand. We will then come
to you and answer your question. If you do not obey this rule you will earn nothing in the
respective round. On the following pages we describe how the experiment proceeds.
General instructions
In this experiment, you are either a person A, a person B, or a person C. What person you are
is shown on the upper right corner of this sheet. One person A, one person B and one person C
form a group. The group composition stays the same for all three rounds. You will, however,
receive no information about the identity of the persons with whom you form a group.
In all rounds, you are person A {B (C)}.
Round 1: Instructions
Person A has to make a proposal how to divide 3000 points between person A, person B and
person C. Persons B and C decide simultaneously and independently of each other, if they
accept or reject the proposal.
If both person B and person C, reject the proposal nobody earns anything in this round. If only
person B rejects the proposal (that is, person C accepts the proposal), nobody earns anything
in this round. If only person C rejects the proposal (that is, person B accepts the proposal),
nobody earns anything in this round. If neither person B nor person C rejects the proposal
(that is, both, person B and person C, accept), then everybody in the group earns points ac-
cording to the proposal of person A.
Please note: a unilateral rejection by person B as well as a unilateral rejection by person C
leads to a situation where everybody in your group earns nothing in this round.
Person A has a decision sheet (Decision sheet A - round 1) where he/she chooses which division
of the 3000 points he/she proposes. Person A indicates his/her decision on this decision sheet.
(The precise way how to do this is described in the specific instructions for person A.)
While person A is making her/his decision, persons B and C are filling in their decision sheets
anonymously and independently from each other. Person B and C each has one decision sheet
(Decision sheet B/C - round 1). On this sheet person B and C indicate for each feasible proposal
whether they accept of reject the proposal. (The precise way how to do this is described in the
specific instructions for person B and C.)
After all persons have filled in their decisions on the decision sheets all decision sheets will be
collected. The experimenters record the decision of person A in your group and put it together
with the decisions of person B and C in your group. All three decisions together determine
your earnings in this round according to the above described rules. How much you have earned
in this round you will learn only after the third round. All decisions are anonymous and you
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have to keep them for yourself.
Specific instructions for person A
We describe here how you have to fill in your decision on the decision sheet. On the Decision
sheet - round 1 you indicate what your proposal for the division of 3000 points between yourself,
person B and person C is.
You will make your proposal by filling in the relevant number of points in the grey fields after
the words “I propose for myself:”, “I propose for person B:”, “I propose for person C:”.
Please, note that you can make only one of the proposals shown in the table on your decision
sheet. In this table, you can find the possible offers to person C in the first row and the possible
offers to person B in the first column. The numbers in the grey field show how much you
demand for yourself, for a given combination of offers to person B and C. For instance, if you
make an offer of x points to persons B and an offer of y points to person C, then you demand
3000-x-y points for yourself.
After you have filled in your decision, please indicate it also by circling the corresponding num-
bers in the first row (offer to person C) and the first column (offer to person B) in the table.
{Specific instructions for person B (C)
Here we explain how you fill in your decisions on the decision sheet.
You have received an Information sheet B (C) - round 1 and a Decision sheet B (C) - round
1. The grey table on the decision sheet shows you all possible combinations of offers person
A can make to you - given an offer to person C (B). In the first (white) row of this table you
find all possible offers to person C (B). In each column below an offer to C (B) you find all
possible offers to you given the offer to C (B). Please note that each combination of an offer
to you and an offer to person C (B) automatically determines how much person A demands
for him/herself. How much person A demands for him/herself for a combination of offers to
you and person C (B) you can easily read off the Information sheet B (C). Please, have a look
at this sheet. In the first column (next to the words “offer to me”) you find all possible offers
of person A to you. The columns left to the first column of the table shows you the amount
person A demands for himself/herself given an offer to you and an offer to person C (B). The
possible offers to person C (B) you can find in the first row of the table under the heading “offer
to person C (B)”.
The formula for the calculation of the demand of person A is: Person A’s demand = 3000 points
- offer to me - offer to person C (B).
You make your decision which of the feasible proposals you want to accept by circling them
on the decision sheet B (C) - round 1. Note that all proposals that you do NOT circle will be
regarded as rejected.}
General instructions (continued)
As already mentioned, this experiment consists of three rounds. In the second and third round,
the same amounts of money as in round 1 are at stake. The rules, however, will be slightly
different in each round. You will be person A {B (C)} again. You will learn about the details
of the new rules at the beginning of each round.
Person A will learn only after the end of round 3 whether the proposal made by person A was
accepted or rejected. Similarly, person B and C will learn only after round 3 which offer was
actually made to them.
At the end of round 3 we will publicly and transparently for you randomly determine which
two out of the three rounds you will be paid out. The determination of your earnings in all
rounds will be monitored by the ‘observer’ who was chosen from among you. The observer will
acknowledge the correct determination of your earnings with his/her signature on the payoff-
forms. The money you earn during this experiment will be paid out to you privately and
anonymously. Your earnings are your private information.
It is important that you understood the consequences of your decisions and the decisions of the
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other persons in your group. Your decisions have a substantial effect on the amount of money
you earn. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We then come to you and answer
your question. Before you make your decisions, please answer the following questions.
Suppose person A makes the following proposal: X points for person B and Y points for person
C
1. How much does person A demand for himself?
2. Suppose person B and C reject the proposal. How much does person A, person B and person
C earn in this case?
3. Suppose person B rejects the proposal but person C accepts the proposal. How much does
person A, person B and person C earn in this case?
4. Suppose person B accepts the proposal but person C rejects the proposal. How much does
person A, person B and person C earn in this case?
5. Suppose person B accepts the proposal and person C accepts the proposal. How much does
person A, person B and person C earn in this case?
After you have answered all questions and the answers were controlled by the experimenters,
please take your decision sheet A {B (C)} - round 1.
Now you have to decide which proposal you make. Fill in your proposal in the corresponding
fields on your decision sheet A - round 1 (left upper corner). Thereafter, please also circle the
corresponding numbers in the first row (“offer to person C”) and first column (“offer to person
B”).
{Now you have to decide which of the possible proposals you accept (and which you reject).
This you do by circling in the table all offers you accept in a clear and distinct way. Please
note that all offers you do not circle are regarded as being rejected.}
You do not have to hurry. Take your time and think well about your decision before you indi-
cate it on the decision sheet. After you filled in your decision, you can change it only with the
approval of the experimenter. When you are ready, please control whether you indicated your
participant number on the decisions sheet (in the upper right corner). Then, turn the decision
sheet face down so that we can collect it.
The instructions for rounds 2 and 3 have been the same as for round 1, except that the expla-
nations concerning the payoff consequences of a rejection differed. They were described in the
same way as for round 1. Subjects also had to answer questions about the calculation of payoffs
again.
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